I may be overreaching but I include risk analysis as a proper subject of systems analysis. I've done enough TRAs to justify that position—at least to myself. So here's a risk analysis topic.
Toying with the idea of getting some certification I took a look at the CISSP and ISC Common Body of Knowledge. One thing I found odd enough to exchange a few emails with ITSec gurus. They assured me that this was the state of the discipline. The offense lay in a particular statement, paraphrased in various documents:
Purely quantitative risk analysis is not possible because the method is attempting to quantify qualitative items.
That, in the words of Dr. Pauli, is not even wrong.
"Nothing that matters is so intangible that it can't be measured," is almost a tautology.
If it matters, it has an effect. Observing that effect is measuring it. Drawing a distinction between its presence or absence is measuring it. Estimating a range of values or probability distribution for it is measuring it.
This isn't unimportant. No one can do a cost/benefit analysis that tells them how much they should spend mitigating a "medium-high risk". The effect is that a lot of people are overspending on security based on a "Scary Movie" qualitative risk assessment.
Bottom line: one of an analyst's skills should be measuring the putatively immeasurable.